

	-X	
	:	
DAVID ROBERTSON,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	ORDER
	:	07-CV-0054 (JFB)(ARL)
– against –	:	
	:	
COUNTY OF NASSAU, SHERIFF EDWARD	:	
REILLY, NASSAU COUNTY CORRECTIONAL	:	
FACILITY,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	
	:	
	:	
	:	
	-X	

On August 23, 2007, Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay issued a Scheduling Order in this case. Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, *pro se* plaintiff was to submit a written narrative of the facts in this case by February 25, 2008. The docket sheet indicates that Magistrate Judge Lindsay's Chambers mailed a copy of the Scheduling Order to plaintiff by certified mail, return receipt requested. However, the docket sheet also indicates that the Scheduling Order was returned to Chambers because plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the address he had provided to the Court. Nearly five months have elapsed since plaintiff was to submit the required narrative, but plaintiff has failed to do so or to otherwise communicate with the Court, including to submit an updated address. For the reasons set forth below, therefore, the Court dismisses plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute.

Rule 41(b) authorizes a district court to “dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with a

court order, treating the noncompliance as a failure to prosecute.” *Simmons v. Abruzzo*, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing *Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962)); see *Lucas v. Miles*, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[D]ismissal [pursuant to Rule 41(b)] is a harsh remedy and is appropriate only in extreme situations.”); *Wynder v. McMahon*, 360 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Rule [41(b)] is intended to serve as a rarely employed, but useful, tool of judicial administration available to district courts in managing their specific cases and general caseload.”); see also *Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc.*, 133 F.2d 187, 188 (2d Cir. 1943) (citing *Blake v. De Vilbiss Co.*, 118 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1941)); *Refior v. Lansing Drop Forge Co.*, 124 F.2d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 1942) (“The cited rule [41(b)] enunciates a wellsettled [sic] concept of practice that a court of equity, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, has general authority . . . to dismiss a cause for want of diligence in prosecution or for failure to comply with a reasonable order of the court made in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.”).

Courts have repeatedly found that “[d]ismissal of an action is warranted when a litigant, whether represented or instead proceeding *pro se*, fails to comply with legitimate court directives to participate in scheduled proceedings, including status conferences.” *Yulle v. Barkley*, No. 9:05-CV-0802, 2007 WL 2156644, at \*2 (N.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007) (citations omitted). A district court contemplating dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim for failure to prosecute and/or to comply with a court order pursuant to Rule 41(b) must consider:

- 1) the duration of plaintiff’s failures or non-compliance; 2) whether plaintiff had notice that such conduct would result in dismissal; 3) whether prejudice to the defendant is likely to result; 4) whether the court balanced its interest in managing its docket against plaintiff’s interest in receiving an opportunity to be heard; and 5) whether the court adequately considered the efficacy of a sanction less draconian than dismissal.

*Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.*, 222 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 2000); see, e.g., *Lucas*, 84 F.3d at 535; *Jackson v. City of New York*, 22 F.3d 71, 74-76 (2d Cir. 1994). In

deciding whether dismissal is appropriate, “[g]enerally, no one factor is dispositive.” *Nita v. Conn. Dep’t of Env. Prot.*, 16 F.3d 482, 485 (2d Cir. 1994); *see Peart*, 992 F.2d at 461 (“[D]ismissal for want of prosecution is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge . . . , [and] the judge’s undoubtedly wide latitude is conditioned by certain minimal requirements.”) (quoting *Merker v. Rice*, 649 F.2d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1981)).

In considering these factors, courts have routinely found that “it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to keep the Court informed of his current address, and failure to do so may justify dismissal for failure to prosecute.” *Sims v. Fernandez*, No. 03 Civ. 2997 (KMW) (DF), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6108, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2004) (collecting cases); *see, e.g., Parris v. Local 32B-32J*, No. 96 Civ. 3604, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8672, at \*2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1998) (“In addition, the plaintiff’s failure to notify either the Court or the Postal Service of her change in address indicates that the complaint should be dismissed independently for failure to prosecute.”). However, the failure to provide a current address must not be considered in isolation, but rather in the context of the other above-referenced factors articulated by the Second Circuit.

Here, five months has elapsed since plaintiff failed to comply with Magistrate Judge Lindsay’s Scheduling Order. In addition, plaintiff has failed to apprise the Court of his change in address. Thus, plaintiff has shown no interest in continuing with this action. Under these circumstances, no sanction less than dismissal will alleviate the prejudice to defendants of continuing to keep this action open. Moreover, the Court needs to avoid calendar congestion and ensure an orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Therefore, all the above-referenced factors favor dismissal of the instant case.

In sum, dismissal for failure to prosecute is clearly warranted. This case is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of

the Court shall close this case.

SO ORDERED

JOSEPH F. BIANCO  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: July 22, 2008  
Central Islip, New York